European University Institute
Doctoral Program in Economics
Third term 2000/1
Growth, History, and Institutions
The aim of this course is to address current developments in macroeconomics and growth theory, with a stress on really-long-term growth factors. Some familiarity with dynamic macroeconomic models and standard econometric techniques will be assumed. The course will meet five times for two hours during the third term. The exam will be a take-home.
Outline and references (starred papers will be distributed)
1. Human capital
*Azariadis, C. and Drazen, A., 1990, Threshold Externalities in Economic Development, Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 501-526.
Jones, L.E. and Manuelli, R.E., 1992, Finite Lifetimes and Growth, Journal of Economic Theory 58, 171-197.
Boldrin, M., 1992, Dynamic Externalities, Multiple Equilibria, and Growth, Journal of Economic Theory 58, 198-218.
Mankiw, N.G., Romer, D. and Weil D.N., 1992, A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 407-437.
*Galor, O. and Zeira, J., 1993, Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, Review of Economic Studies 60, 35-52.
Goldin, C., 1998, America's Graduation from High School: The Evolution and Spread of Secondary Schooling in the Twentieth Century, Journal of Economic History 58, 345-374.
*Bertocchi, G. and Spagat, M., 1998, The Evolution of Modern Educational Systems. Technical vs. General Education, Distributional Conflict, and Growth, CEPR Discussion Paper 1925, revised 2001.
Goldin, C., 1999, Egalitarianism and the Returns to Education During the Great Transformation of American Education, Journal of Political Economy 107, S65-S94.
*Bourguignon, F. and Verdier, T., 2000, Oligarchy, Democracy, Inequality and Growth, Journal of Development Economics 62, 285, 313.
*Galor, O. and Moav, O., 2001, Das Human Kapital, mimeo, MIT.
3.1. The extension of the franchise
*Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A., 2000, Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 1167-99.
Gradstein M. and Justman, M., 1999, The Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th Century Britain, Explorations in Economic History 36, 109-127.
*Bertocchi, G. and Canova, F., 1996, Did Colonization Matter for Growth? An Empirical Exploration into the Historical Causes of Africa's Underdevelopment, CEPR Discussion Paper 1444, revised 2001.
*Acemoglu, D. Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A., 2000, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development. An Empirical Investigation, NBER Working Paper 7771.
McArthur, J.W. and Sachs, J.D., 2001, Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000), NBER Working Paper 8114.
3.3. Malthus and Darwin
Kremer, M., 1993, Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 681-716.
*Galor, O. and Weil, D.N, 2000, Population, Technology and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond, American Economic Review 90, 806-828.
Hansen, G.D. and Prescott, E.C., 1999, Malthus to Solow, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 257.
Jones, C.J., 1999, Was an Industrial Revolution Inevitable? Economic Growth Over the Very Long Run, NBER Working Paper 7375, revised 2001.
*Galor, O. and Moav, O., 2000, Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth, Brown University Working Paper No. 2000-18.
4. Social capital and trust
*Knack, S. and Keefer, P, 1997, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-country Investigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1251-1288.
*Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E., 2000, The Determinants of Trust, NBER Working Paper 7621.
*Glaeser, E.L., Laibson, D. and Sacerdote, B., 2000, The Economic Approach to Social Capital, NBER Working Paper 7728.
*Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L., 2000, The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development, CEPR Discussion Paper 2383.